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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of the 2003 Illinois gaming tax increase on Indiana riverboat
gaming demand. The four riverboats located in Indiana’s Northeast corner are examined. Slot
machine coin-in from January 2000 to December 2006 is chosen to represent gaming demand.
Multiple regression analysis is used to model both the tax increase and account for seasonality
in the data. The findings reveal that a segment of Indiana riverboat operators experienced an
increase in gaming demand when the tax increases took effect. The findings suggest that
legislators should acknowledge and evaluate the negative economic pressures that tax increases
have on their own state’s commercial gaming operators and recognize the benefits tax increase
bring to the gaming industry in competing states.
Keywords: riverboat gaming, gaming taxes, Indiana riverboat, commercial gaming,
cross-state substitution
INTRODUCTION
The occurrence of gaming taxes are generally accepted by the various stakeholders of
commercial gaming as an unavoidable cost of doing business. In an economic environment that
is at the minimum difficult and at the maximum impossible to enter, state gaming taxes are
debated by commercial gaming stakeholders primarily with respect to their rate and not their
existence. The restricted access to operate legal commercial gaming is partially due to the
restricted nature of licensure. The variance in the degree of difficulty a potential commercial
gaming entity faces depends largely on state and local laws.
The commercial gaming market in the Midwestern United States can be characterized by
two primary trends since gaming was legalized in the early nineties: states have through

deregulation improved their operators’ abilities to compete for local and most importantly
interstate business. The price operators have paid for decreased deregulation has been a steady
increase in state gaming taxes. The purpose of this research is to quantify the effect of one of
these gaming tax increases on interstate gaming demand/wagering volume which in this article is
represented by coin-in. By quantifying the effect of an increase in a gaming tax this research
will provide evidence in support of or in contrast to both firm management theory, profit
maximization theory and provide insight into Pigovian tax theory. The stakeholders to
commercial gaming frequently argue that commercial gaming is believed to exist outside of the
accepted rules of economic theory or that commercial gaming is not vulnerable to traditional
economic pressures.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
In an attempt to draw parallels to other situations that mirror the increase in gaming taxes
in Illinois, research that addresses hotel occupancy taxes and the 1986 Tax Reform Act on Real
Estate proves instructive. Gaming research focusing on deregulation repercussions and general
gaming forecasting is also discussed. These particular examples not only inform the
understanding of likely effects of inherent changes to taxation rates but also provide insight into
various applicable methodologies that could provide valuable analysis into the Illinois gaming
tax restructuring and its influence in competing commercial gaming states. In addition, this
review will investigate both tax theory and profit maximization/firm theory to better understand
the implication of these tax increases. Insight into both taxation and firm theory might explain or
predict the impact of tax changes on commercial gaming.
Pygovian Tax Theory
Attributed to Pigou (1920) economists have recognized that indirect taxation can be
utilized to counteract injustices inherent in the allocation of certain resources. A tax can be
levied which in theory will counteract or confront the entity in question. A tax or price on the
generator of a perceived negative externality should reflect the impact that the generator inflicts
by their production of a product or service on others (Sandmo, 1975).
Pygovian taxation has also been referred to as “sin taxes” or taxes that attempt to adjust
negative externalities of a business or markets activity. Gaming has of course been an industry
that has been subject to this form or theory of taxation. The adoption of Pygovian taxation is
alleged to bring various counterproductive repercussions. For example: lowering of profits and
related job and investment loss, creates moral hazard for policy makers who simultaneously rely
on the pygovian tax revenue while professing to curb the related behavior or consumption.
A distinction should be drawn between Pigovian taxation and what is frequently termed
“sin taxes”. While Pigovian taxation inherently and fairly professes to retrieve funds
commensurate with the damage in industry inflicts, the use of sin taxes in practice rarely is
reflective of any attempt to accurately measure damage or harm. In the case of commercial
gaming, attempts to quantify the costs and benefits have been largely disappointing due to the

complexity of the task. Commercial gaming’s current tax environment is to some degree the
result of gambling’s history as a “vice” and the related historical perceptions (Meich, 2008)
Firm and Profit Maximization Theory
Profit maximization is the concept that describes what is generally accepted as one of the
primary objectives of a firm. Profit is defined as the measure of total revenue of a firm minus its
total costs. Hence, profit maximization describes identifying a level of output where the
difference between total costs and revenues is the greatest (Becker, 2005). While evidence
suggests that individuals in a firm do not always pursue profit maximizing behaviors, instead
direct their actions to maximize sales, employees, equipment beyond profit maximization ideals
(Alchian, 1965). It is noteworthy that the literature does not account for the behavior of
management or owners of firms faced with disincentives such as a stepped tax structure that
rewards reducing revenues.
Occupancy Taxes
Hiemstra and Ismail studied the use of occupancy tax rates in various municipalities. The
authors point out that policymakers adopt occupancy taxes in an erroneous attempt to produce
revenues from individuals who are non-constituents and thereby eliminating the impact of the tax
burden on the legislators future election success. When the researchers analyzed the elasticity of
demand which was represented by occupancy rates, they found that a 9.8% room tax resulted in a
3% decrease in occupancy (Hiemstra & Ismail, 1992; Hiemstra & Ismail, 1993). Legislators
mistakenly view the enactment of the occupancy taxes as having little or no economic and
political consequences. Hiemstra & Ismail demonstrate with empirical evidence that the tax
increase has a negative influence on demand. Many stakeholders of the gaming industry allege
that legislators view commercial gaming as being unaffected by comparable increases of gaming
tax rates or the implementation of new gaming tax policies such as admission taxes.
1986 Tax Reform Act
The 1986 Tax Reform Act is widely considered the most influential modification of the
tax code in recent history. Real estate is recognized as the industry most impacted by the
changes and the subject of a multitude of resulting research. The tax code reform primarily
affected real estate investment through changes in depreciation scheduling. However,
additionally; flow through tax losses were minimized and finally loss offset limitations were put
in place (Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1990).
In 1990, Sanger et al. employed intervention analysis (which was described as an
intervention in a time series) for their research. The authors defended their approach by pointing
out that the tax reform represented an event that altered the stochastic process. The researchers
chose the investment returns of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) as their study’s
dependent variable. REITS are financial entities that invest in real estate and related assets with
the intention of earning a return for their investors (US securities & exchange commission.2004).
Much like the approach this study will adopt, Sanger et al. chose to model the tax reform
intervention with a dummy variable while accounting for seasonal effects. The researchers

discovered that the real estate market appraised the implementation of the new tax code to the
financial detriment of real estate owners (Sanger et al., 1990).
Smith and Woodward (1996) attempted to understand the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. Their study evaluated the effects of the above mentioned tax reform on the value of
apartments. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional panel data design to examine their data the
researchers discovered that a couple of obstacles threaten the quality of their results. The authors
needed to control for the influence of overbuilding in their analysis. Additionally, the
researchers acknowledged and checked for the potential influence of autocorrelation.
Appropriate measures suggested that autocorrelation was a factor so the researchers adopted the
Parks method of analysis to deal with the problem. Much like in the previous Sanger study, a
dummy variable was used to represent the implementation of the new tax code, and an additional
dummy variable was created to represent and control for overbuilding. The researchers
concluded that the 1986 Tax Reform Act had a statistically significant negative impact on the
value of apartments (Smith & Woodward, 1996).
Gaming Forecasting
The following is an attempt to provide an overview of gaming related research involving
changes in both regulation and related tax policy. The literature provided should build a better
understanding of gaming tax policy, changes to the regulatory environment affecting commercial
gaming, and the evolution of commercial gaming in the Midwestern, United States.

Deregulation
Multiple researchers have investigated how deregulation has impacted gaming volume.
These studies are valuable to this research because they provide some framework for
determining how this analysis should attempt to investigate how a tax rate change impacts
gaming demand. Methodologically there are obvious similarities between how one might assess
a regulatory change and a gaming tax rate increase. Despite the reality that the effect on demand
might be inverted, regulatory easing and tax rate increases both are events involving a single
inflection point introduced into a time series analysis. Of more practical note, acts of
deregulation and gaming tax rate increases have often occurred simultaneously in a type of quid
pro quo.
Deregulation in Atlantic City
In 1998, Nichols analyzed the 1991 deregulation of the commercial gaming industry in
Atlantic City. Using an ARIMA model (a Box Jenkins autoregressive moving average), the
researcher assessed the impact of regulatory changes the resulted in increased operating hours
and increases in slot machine proliferation on gaming win. Incidentally, the author addressed the
dilemma involved when attempting to operationalize gaming demand or gaming volume using
casino win. Casino win, synonymous with gambler losses, is also referred to a gross gaming
revenue. Gross gaming revenue is a problematic measure of gaming volume because it includes
monies that are the result of casino complimentaries (comps); therefore when adding up gross

gaming revenues the casino is counting winnings of its own cash. Nichols argued that after
adjusting for comp ratio (which he calculated as 8.5% of win) casino win was the preferable
dependent variable since it did not include non-gaming revenues that impacted general revenue
options such as EBITDA (Nichols, 1998b).
Shonkwiler (1993) chose a structural time series methodology to examine the effect of
Atlantic City commercial gaming casinos on gaming volume in Nevada. The Shonkwiler
research exemplifies the inclusion of an extraneous event and its impact on time series data.
This study theoretically closely parallels the research presented in this study since tax changes in
one state are assessed with regard to their impact in a different state. The researcher advocates
his methodological approach by presenting the efficacy of structural time seriew modeling of
linear trends with the potential for seasonality. The author found that the legalization of
commercial gaming in Atlantic City reduced Nevada gaming revenues by somewhere between
10 and 12 percent (Shonkwiler, 1993).
Deregulation and Taxation Policy: Midwestern Riverboats
United States Midwestern riverboat market deregulation was examined by Nichols
(1998a). In a response to the 1994 Illinois’ introduction of less regulated riverboat gambling,
Iowa revamped their 1991 original strict inaugural regulations and eliminated mandated sailing,
loss limits and space restrictions in response to 1994 Illinois’ introduction of less regulated
riverboat gambling in 1994. Casino win, total admissions and win per admission were used as
dependent variables for regression analysis to control for the effect of day of the week,
seasonality, location, and per capita income while attempting to evaluate the impact of
deregulation. The results indicated that deregulation had a significant impact on cross-border
substitution, by having increased the three dependent variables: win, win per admission, and
admission (Nichols, 1998). Nichols work with Iowa and Illinois riverboat deregulation has
obvious similarities to this study’s investigation into the impact of gaming taxation rate changes
in Illinois and the resulting influence on demand in the neighboring state of Indiana.
A significant reduction in complimentary play, food, and lodging due to the 2003 Illinois
tax restructuring was predicted by gaming analyst Falcone(Falcone, 2003b). Casino operators
cannot easily pass cost of business increases on to their customers. Therefore, operators resort to
saving on marketing expenses or reducing labor expenses. The restricted options for addressing
increased expenses to some extent distinguish gaming from other consumer goods and service
industries. A possible other solution to counter this pressure, is for operators to tighten the hold
or par of their slot machines which will eventually negatively impact their gaming demand
because of increased price of play. Ultimately, the burden of tax increases rests on operators and
it decreases invested capital, development projects, reduces employees, and the limits marketing
and/or complimentary expenses (Falcone, 2003a).
Measuring Demand
Researchers have relied on numerous variables as mentioned throughout this review of
related literature for the purpose of forecasting or quantifying gaming volume. This study uses
slot machine coin-in as the indicator of gaming demand or volume. The decision to rely on coin-

in is based on a number of factors. The first and foremost reason is that all alternative measures
of gaming demand are not very realistic. It becomes extremely difficult for the operators to
quantify the amount wagered on table games (Eisendrath et al., 2008). In contrast table drop
which is sometimes used as a measure of demand just indicates the amount converted to chips
and does not tells the correct amount wagered. Kilby et al. (2004) mentioned that revenue
figures can fluctuate with short-term luck and volatility on both the player and casino’s part.
Thus, coin-in emerges as the most appropriate measure of gaming volume (Eisendrath et al.,
2008; Lucas, Dunn, & Kharitonova, 2006).
Secondly, the coin-in contribution is predominant to the overall commercial casino
revenue sources, hence this research relies on coin-in to represent gaming demand. Researchers
who analyzed the Las Vegas, Nevada market have opted for coin-in as the preferential proxy for
gaming demand. Their decision was justified partially due to the significant impact of coin-in
towards overall revenues. Nearly 50 percent of gaming win revenues in the Las Vegas market
result from slot win (Eisendrath et al., 2008). Whereas, slot machines or electronic gaming
devices (EGDs) account for approximately 90 percent of Indiana adjusted gaming revenues
(Indiana Gaming Board, 2005).
Hypothesis, data and methodology
The main hypothesis of this study is that the 2003 Illinois gaming tax restructuring will
positively impact Indiana Chicagoland gaming demand as represented by the coin-in dependent
variable. The expression “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” describes the predictor
dummy or independent variable for the tax change.
Main Hypothesis
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in Indiana Chicagoland coin-in after
the Illinois tax restructuring. The null is expressed by the equation:

H 0 : Coefficient of “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” = 0
The research hypothesis which predicts that there will be a difference in Indiana
Chicagoland coin-in is expressed by the equation:

H 1 : Coefficient of “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” ≠ 0
Data Collection
The secondary data examined in this study was retrieved from the Indiana Gaming
Commission Monthly Reports (IGB, 2000-2006). The data provided in the IGB Monthly
Reports is a collection of various results from all Indiana commercial docksites. This data is
available to the public via request or can be directly accessed through the IGB website. Since
this investigation was primarily interested in the effect of the 2003 Illinois gaming tax
restructuring on cross-state gaming demand, a decision was made to focus on the docksites or
operators with the closest proximity to the Chicago area in the state of Indiana. Four commercial

gaming operations met this criteria and the coin-in dependent variable for each month is a total
of each of these four commercial gaming operations coin-in. This research will examine the
coin-in of the four Chicagoland Indiana riverboats over 84 months; January 2000 to December
2006. All Indiana docksites report coin-in on a monthly basis to the Indiana Gaming
Commission. Coin-in is relied upon as the preferable proxy for gaming demand due to the
dominant contribution of slots play to overall gaming revenue and also due to its reliability.
Figure 1 illustrates a detailed breakdown of the relative importance of Slot (EGD) win
contribution based on docksite (win is chosen in this instance for comparison purposes due to the
imperfection of using drop to quantify table game demand).
Figure 1
Indiana Docksite Win: Comparison of Table Games and Slot Machines.
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Linear Regression Model
Because the data to be examined is a times series, trend and seasonality are addressed in
the regression model. The time variable is accounted for as follows: the first month is assigned
“1”, the second month “2”, and continuing this pattern through the last month which is assigned
“84”. This variable will reveal the presence of trend in the data set. Trend refers to the
downward or upward movement of a time series over an extended period of time. When time
series data is modeled, a variable that indicates an upward trend generally reflects changes in
market growth, changes in total population, or long-term adjustments in per capita income
(Bowerman, O'Connell, & Koehler, 2005).
Seasonal variations or seasonality in the time series data set reflect peaks and valleys in
the data that occur within the confines of a calendar year. This research first uses dummy
variables to assess the presence of seasonality. Dummy variables representing the months
February through December are added to the regression model. Only 11 months are represented
by the dummy variables since the twelfth month is accounted for by the equations constant term.
Reflecting the interest in whether the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring impacted the Indiana
Chicagoland docksites, the following regression model was tested:

Y t = β 0 + β 1t + β 2Feb + β 3Mar + β 4Apr + β 5May + β 6June + β 7July + β 8Aug +
β 9Sept + β 10Oct + β 11Nov + β 12Dec + β 1370%tax + et
Yt describes the four Indiana Chicagoland riverboat’s coin-in in dollars. The “t”variable
tests for the presence of trend in the data set. The months February through December are
modeled with seasonal dummy variables. For example: Feb = {1 if period t is February, 0
otherwise}. A dummy variable is used for period that reflects the 70% tax level and the overall
2003 Illinois tax restructuring = {1 if period with tax hike, 0 otherwise}.
Results
The assumptions of the regression model are that the error terms are independent and
normally distributed with mean 0 and a common unknown variance sigma squared. Researchers
often find that hospitality and gaming data regression results commonly violate these
assumptions. A primary reason for this violation is the seasonal nature of the hospitality and
gaming industry. To identify the potential violation of the assumption of independence, the time
serie’s regression residuals are tested for autocorrelation. The results of the autocorrelation tests
on this regression were that autocorrelation was not a component of the model. Trend was a
component to the data and was quadratic in nature. It was best modeled by combining a
standardized t variable with a squared standardized t variable.

Figure 2
Times Series Representation of Indiana Chicagoland Riverboat Coin-in
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Numerous monthly dummy variables assessing seasonality were discarded from the final
regression equation due to statistical insignificance when held to the .05 significance threshold.
As an example, the October dummy variable was removed from the regression equation based on
the inability to reject Ho=O(p=.283). Following the same criteria; February, April, May, July,
August, September, and October were all eliminated from the regression model.

All remaining coefficients were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level and
thus rejecting all corresponding null hypotheses. Most noteworthy was the finding that the 2003
Illinois Tax Restructuring (70% Illinois Tax Change) variable was found to be statistically
significant (p < .001) on Indiana Chicagoland riverboat demand. Variance inflation factors
(VIF) were incorporated to test for multicollinearity. VIF results all registered at 1.5 or below
which suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue with the regression model.
After examining the sample autocorrelation function (ACF) (see figure 3), the lack of
significant spikes suggest the absence of influence of autocorrelation in the error terms.
Therefore, it was determined that Box Jenkins modeling was unnecessary.
Figure 3
Sample Autocorrelation Function

Table 1
Regression Results
Variable
Constant
T Std
T Std^2
March
June
November
December
70% Illinois Tax
Restructuring

Coefficient
786992105
25062029
-20176369
68955386
-48430463
-53167359
-47155074
24566054

T value
102.47**
6.60**
-4.45**
5.41**
-3.80**
-4.16**
--3.69**
2.64*

VIF
-1.2
1.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.5

*Significant at alpha = .05; **Significant at alpha = .01. R-Square: 71.5%, Overall F
Statistic: 27.24***

The final regression
Indiana Chicagoland coin-in = 786992105 + 25062029 t_std - 20176369 tstd2 +
68955386 DMar- 48430463 DJun - 53167359 DNov - 47155074 DDec+ 24566054 + 70%
Illinois Tax Change + et
Discussion of results
The regression model confirms that the 2003 Illinois Tax Restructuring had a positive
effect on Indiana gaming demand. Trend was a component in the final model. Previous tax
increases, increased competition with surrounding states, and the increase in price for the final
Illinois docksite license which hindered the sale of the last license all contribute to explain the
overall lack of change in coin-in trend. The month of March was a significant positive seasonal
component in the final regression model. This is possibly due to climate factors inherent in
Midwestern United States spring weather. It should be remembered that Indiana is a
Midwestern state where weather plays a factor in most activities. This may explain why the
March carries a positive influence on gaming demand. June, November and December all had
negative influences on coin-in. The downturn in June may be associated with the end of the
school year and families might vacation around non-gaming activities while November and
December are associated with the onset of colder weather and decreased activities.
Conclusions and recommendation for future research
By examining the relationship between the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring and Indiana
coin-in, this research indicates that increases in gaming taxation had a significant positive effect
on Indiana gaming demand. The results of the study support the findings of research on
occupancy taxes, real estate taxation, and sin taxes that have consistently found a negative
correlation between demand and increased taxation and restrictions. Specifically, this study
supports the research hypothesis predicting that increased gaming taxes will have a negative
impact on gaming demand.
This study appears to support aforementioned taxation theory and firm theory. Taxation
theory predicts negative repercussions inherent when policymakers fail to accurately assess the
external damages inherent in the creation and sale of a product or the offering of a service and
administer an unfounded tax. This study’s findings suggest that this approach may drive
business to competing tax authorities that levy respectively lower costs on competing industries.
Despite frequent editorial supposition estimating the impact of increases in gaming taxes
on the commercial gaming industry, there exists no prior empirical study examining this issue
the knowledge of this researcher. Previous research has addressed changes in commercial
gaming restrictions with similar results. Commercial gaming’s stakeholders have frequently
advocated the economic penalties inherent in inflated gaming taxation but have been unable to
reference academically rigorous research supporting or refuting their position.

The findings of this research must be considered with regard to its inherent limitations.
The external validity of these results is somewhat limited given that this research only analyzes a
single tax increase in a single Midwestern state. The usage of coin-in, while ostensibly the best
measure of gaming demand, does not constitute the entire revenue equation. Therefore,
understanding the table game contribution to revenue will strengthen the understanding of the
correlation between gaming taxation and gaming demand.
Although slot revenue comprises the greatest proportion of Indiana total gaming revenue,
table play nevertheless fulfills an important function in the overall revenue mix. In addition, it is
unclear whether table players are more or less impacted by expense alterations in conjunction to
tax changes. Therefore understanding this market segment is critical and slot demand should not
be assumed to reflect generalized gaming demand which includes table games. Future research
into this topic could prove beneficial. The ability to measure table game play should improve as
casino based table game systems become more efficient and more widely adopted.
Much speculation has been cast upon the adjustments managers of commercial gaming
operations invoke when pressured by increased gaming taxes. Future research attempting to
uncover whether and to what degree marketing expenditures, capital improvement, and
employee retention/hiring rates are curtailed would be useful.
Further analysis of the impact of other states gaming tax changes and the effect on
gaming demand would contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between
gaming taxes and gaming demand. It is conceivable that other Midwestern states with limited
gaming licenses are either more or less tolerant to gaming tax increases than less restricted states
such as Nevada or Mississippi. In addition, research designed to understand how gaming tax
restructuring affects gaming demand in neighboring states might serve to illuminate the interstate
balance among commercial gaming states. If additional research indicates that gaming-related
tax increases move gaming demand and tax receipts from the legislator’s own state to their
neighbor as this research suggests, state governments may became increasingly cautionary before
making drastic changes.
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